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28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) Bars Review Of Remand Order Based On § 1445(a)

In re Norfolk Southern Railway Co.
Nos. 13–2112 & 13–2127
(United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, June 23, 2014)
by Richard J. Medoff, Summer Associate
Semmes, Bowen & Semmes (www.semmes.com)

Available at: http://www.ca4.uscourts.gov/Opinions/Published/132112.P.pdf

In In re Norfolk Southern Railway Co., a case involving the removal of a personal injury case to Virginia Federal Court and subsequent remand to Virginia State Court, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the order remanding the case according to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) was the type of ruling included under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), and as such, was not reviewable by appeal or via mandamus, under 28. U.S.C. § 1447(d). Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal and denied the mandamus petition. Judge Traxler wrote the opinion, in which Judges Niemeyer and Duncan joined.

By way of factual background, after applying for and being awarded federal workers' compensation benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), Gilbert Bynum, an injured railroad worker, filed suit in state court against his employer, Norfolk Southern Railway Co., pursuant to the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA). Norfolk Southern removed the case to federal court arguing that the LHWCA covered Bynum’s injury and barred any recovery under FELA, and asserting that whether Bynum's injury was covered by the LHWCA was exclusively a federal question.

After removal, Bynum moved to remand the case to state court, alleging that the district court lacked jurisdiction to determine coverage under the LHWCA because Congress had specifically eliminated the jurisdiction of the federal district court concerning the LHWCA, and asserting that his claim was not removable pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a). That same day, Norfolk Southern filed a motion in the district court to dismiss Bynum's complaint, arguing that, although his claim was filed under FELA, his injury actually fell within the scope of the LHWCA's coverage and the LHWCA therefore provided the exclusive remedy for his injury.

Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1445(a) prohibits the removal of a civil action arising under FELA which is filed in state court against a railroad, the district court concluded that Bynum's FELA claim must be remanded to state court. Accordingly, the district court granted Bynum's remand motion and denied as moot Norfolk Southern's motion to dismiss. Norfolk Southern appealed to the Fourth Circuit, and also filed a petition for a writ of mandamus requesting the Court to vacate the district court's order and either dismiss the case or, alternatively, remand the case to the district court to address the merits of its federal defense to the FELA claim. The Court agreed to consider the mandamus petition together with the related appeal, and thus the two cases were consolidated. Bynum subsequently moved to dismiss the appeal as barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) and to have the mandamus petition denied for the same reason.

On appeal, the Court first addressed whether it was authorized to review the merits of the district court’s remand order, concluding that it was not. The Court noted that the district court's decision was based on the simple fact that a FELA claim brought in state court cannot be removed to a federal court under § 1445(a). The Court explained that § 1447(c) authorizes remand based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remand based on any defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction that was raised by a party within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. The Court further explained that § 1447(d) generally bars appellate review of a remand that is ordered on one of those bases. The Court noted, however, that the § 1445(a) bar does not deprive courts of subject matter jurisdiction over cases to which it applies. The Court thus faced the question of whether nonremovability based on § 1445(a) is a “defect other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction” within the meaning of § 1447(c). The Court concluded that it was. To the Court, it was apparent from the context of § 1447, that “defect” referred to a failure to comply with the statutory requirements for removal provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–1453. Because that scope encompassed § 1445(a), the Court concluded that the § 1447(d) bar applied, and thus, the Court lacked jurisdiction to review the remand order on appeal.

Second, the Court addressed whether it was authorized to grant mandamus relief, concluding that it was not. The Court noted that § 1447(d)’s restriction on review of remand orders applies to review “on appeal or otherwise,” and that the Supreme Court has interpreted that language to forbid the use of mandamus to circumvent the requirements of § 1447(d). The Court added that granting mandamus relief would also be inappropriate because Norfolk Southern had not made the requisite showing that its “right to the issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable.” Specifically, the Court found that Norfolk Southern had not shown that it was clearly entitled to have the district court dismiss Bynum's FELA claim rather than remand it to the state court. Thus, because § 1447(d) barred review of the district court’s order by appeal or via mandamus, the Court dismissed Norfolk Southern’s appeal and denied its mandamus petition.